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SIPDIS - GENEVA FOR JCIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2029
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [KACT](#) [START](#) [JCIC](#) [US](#) [RS](#)
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR A/S GOTTEMOELLER AT U.S./RUSSIA
TALKS IN ROME ON A START FOLLOW-ON AGREEMENT

REF: STATE 036942

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, Director, VCI/SI.
Reason: 1.4(b) and (d).

¶1. (SBU) Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Rose Gottemoeller, will hold talks regarding a START follow-on agreement with Russian MFA Director of Security and Disarmament Affairs Anatoliy Antonov, as proposed in Reftel. Accompanying A/S Gottemoeller will be Dr. George W. Look, the NSC Senior Director for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, and Edward (Ted) Warner, the Secretary of Defense Representative to the START follow-on negotiations. The discussions are scheduled to be held in Rome on April 24, 2009.

¶2. (S) GUIDANCE: In addition to discussing the timing/pace of the negotiations and our bilateral process, Delegation may draw on the points in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 below to describe initial U.S. thinking and to seek Russian views relating to a START follow-on agreement. Delegation should report on this first meeting on a follow-on agreement as expeditiously as possible.

¶3. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Points on U.S. views regarding elements for a START follow-on agreement.

- The U.S. believes a START follow-on agreement should include, at a minimum, the following elements:

- a. An overall warhead limit on operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads;
- b. An overall limit on the number of strategic offensive arms;
- c. Verification provisions drawn from START, appropriately modified and simplified for the provisions of the new treaty. This would include, for example, reentry vehicle inspections (modified to confirm the actual number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads), data update inspections, Conversion or Elimination inspections, technical exhibitions, Portal Monitoring at Votkinsk, telemetry provisions, etc.; and
- d. Establishment of a data base and continuation of appropriate data update and movement notifications, building on that in START, updated with new categories as necessary.

¶4. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Points on U.S. views regarding the format for a July report to the Presidents.

- The April 1 Presidential Joint Statement requires that we report on progress achieved in working out a new agreement. The U.S. believes it would be desirable for the Presidents to sign a framework document in July. The U.S. hopes that the Russian delegation can agree to work toward that result.

- The United States does not intend that the document signed would be a legally binding agreement, which could give both the United States and Russia difficulty with our respective legislatures.

- In the past, the U.S. has used a variety of instruments to record common understandings with other countries that are regarded as political commitments rather than legally binding obligations.

- We are looking at previous documents as templates for what the Presidents could sign in July.

- The most applicable example we found was the June 17, 1992, Washington Summit Joint Understanding regarding the mutual understanding reached by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms.

- The understandings recorded in the 1952 Joint Understanding eventually evolved into the START II Treaty, which was signed but never entered into force.

- If we can reach an understanding on key elements of a START follow-on agreement, we could use those elements as the basis for drafting a joint understanding, structured along the lines of the 1992 instrument, to serve as a record of the Presidents' decisions in July.

15. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Points on U.S. views regarding effective verification for a START follow-on agreement.

- Presidents Obama and Medvedev have determined that the START follow-on agreement will include effective verification measures drawn from U.S. and Russian experience in implementing the START Treaty.

- We have already begun looking at the START Treaty's provisions and are beginning to formulate recommendations on what provisions should be carried forward as well as what we may need to revise. The initial views are as follows:

a. RVOSI will be an important inspection, but will need to be modified and improved in order to verify the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

b. Procedures will be developed to verify the number of operationally deployed nuclear warheads associated with heavy bombers.

c. Conversion or Elimination requirements should be retained; however, the provisions should be reviewed, modified, and improved to reflect lessons learned from START and to make them less burdensome, less expensive, and more environmentally friendly.

d. Cooperative measures should generally be retained.

e. Other inspections should also be retained; however, for some inspections, notably Facilities subject to Suspect Site Inspection (SSI) and Formerly Declared Facility inspections (FDF), there may be alternatives that would reduce the burden of these inspections, e.g., removal from the inspection list and rely on "special access visits," or extend the timeline for initiation of the inspections.

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